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A CASE FOR DEFERENCE IN AMERICAN INDIAN HEALTH
LAW
Ashley Murphy*
I. Introduction
Landing on the sandy shores of Tabasco, Hernan Cortez embarked on his
mission. As a Spanish conquistador, he was to explore and conquer the
newly discovered Mexico and convert its indigenous inhabitants to
Christianity. 1 After a brief stint in the Yucatan Peninsula, Cortez’s party
began to push west, eventually arriving in Tenochtitlan. 2 There he
discovered a bustling metropolis with large public squares and markets,
apothecaries, complex dams to regulate tides, and hundreds of thousands
who inhabited the great city.3 Just seventy days later, tens of thousands
were dead, not at the swords of the Spaniards, but by the breath of the
conquistadors—through a disease called smallpox. 4
A century later, in modern-day Massachusetts, the Wampanoag people
caught the same horrific disease from French captors.5 The pandemic
ravished native villages in the area for four years, decimating the local

* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Jessie Szalay, Hernán Cortés: Conqueror of the Aztecs, LIVE SCIENCE (Sept. 28,
2017), https://www.livescience.com/39238-hernan-cortes-conqueror-of-the-aztecs.html.
2. Id.
3. Cortes Describes Tenochtitlan, AM. HIST. ASS’N, https://www.historians.org/
teaching-and-learning/teaching-resources-for-historians/teaching-and-learning-in-the-digitalage/the-history-of-the-americas/the-conquest-of-mexico/letters-from-hernan-cortes/cortesdescribes-tenochtitlan (last visited Oct. 27, 2021) (excerpting a letter from Cortés to
Emperor Charles V).
4. Richard Gunderman, How Smallpox Devastated the Aztecs – and Helped Spain
Conquer an American Civilization 500 Years Ago, PBS NEWS HOUR (Feb. 23, 2019), https://
www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-smallpox-devastated-the-aztecs-and-helped-spainconquer-an-american-civilization-500-years-ago.
5. Of Plague and Pilgrims: The Grim Story Behind the First Thanksgiving, IN THE
PAST LANE (Nov. 19, 2012), http://inthepastlane.com/of-plague-and-pilgrims-how-adevastating-epidemic-shaped-the-first-thanksgiving-nov-18-2012/; see also U.S. COMM’N ON
C.R., BROKEN PROMISES: EVALUATING THE NATIVE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 2
(2004) (“From the earliest days of colonization, the diseases brought from the Old World
proved far more lethal than any weapon in the European arsenal. Infectious diseases,
including measles, smallpox, and plague among others, ‘annihilated entire communities even
before they had seen a single European.’”).
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Native population. 6 In the end, three-quarters of the Wampanoag people
died from smallpox.7 Ever since explorers and settlers introduced European
diseases to Native America, Native peoples have been more susceptible to
medical ailments.8 While smallpox may not be of concern today, Native
Americans struggle to combat higher rates of diabetes, liver and heart
disease, and obesity than non-Native ethnicities.9
At multiple points throughout its 230-year history, Congress has
endeavored to address the health needs of Native Americans.10 To do this,
Congress often made specific resources available to members of Indian
tribes.11 Whether those resources were, and continue to be, sufficient is
largely subject to debate among legal scholars and health professionals. 12
However, an unmistakably evident fact, derived from statistical analysis, is
that Native Americans are disproportionately affected by adverse health
conditions as compared to other ethnic groups.13 In light of these vast health
disparities affecting Indigenous Peoples, Congress now focuses on
strengthening the health of the Indigenous by promulgating health laws,
creating administrative agencies, and developing health programs that serve
Indian tribes.14 Created for the sole purpose of providing healthcare for
tribes, these statutorily prescribed services aim to combat the disparities
that exist in Indian Country.15
To analyze the agencies that serve Native Americans, one must
understand the broad power that agencies exercise when interpreting federal
6. Of Plague and Pilgrims: The Grim Story Behind the First Thanksgiving, supra note
5.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 5, at 2 (“It has long been recognized in Native
American and medical communities that Native Americans are dying of diabetes,
alcoholism, tuberculosis, suicide, unintentional injuries, and other health conditions at
shocking rates.”); Disparities, INDIAN HEALTH SERV. (Oct. 2019), https://www.ihs.gov/
newsroom/factsheets/disparities/.
10. See U.S. COMM‘N ON C.R., supra note 5, at 2–4; see also AIPRC’s Report on Indian
Health, AM. INDIAN J., Feb. 1977, at 17, 17–18.
11. See AIPRC’s Report on Indian Health, supra note 10, at 17–18; see also Legislative
History, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/ihcia/history/ (last visited Oct. 27,
2021); Donald Warne & Linda Bane Frizzell, American Indian Health Policy: Historical
Trends and Contemporary Issues, 104 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 263, 263–67 (2014).
12. Warne & Frizzell, supra note 11, at 263–67; see also William Boyum, Health Care:
An Overview of the Indian Health Service, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV 241, 241–42 (1988-1989).
13. See U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 5, at 7–8.
14. See Boyum, supra note 12, at 243–46.
15. Id.
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statutes. The courts generally grant broad deference to administrative
agencies to determine the meaning of ambiguous statutes promulgated by
Congress.16 The rationale supporting such deference rests upon the
inference that agencies, which Congress designates as the experts in a
particular field, have the expertise necessary to handle a specific issue in a
more detailed, effective, and adequate manner as compared to other entities
or individuals.17 The landmark case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council solidified this policy rationale and prescribed
the scope of deference that agencies should be afforded.18
On the other hand, courts have also adopted a nuanced approach to
statutory interpretation when analyzing a statute involving Indian tribes.
Specifically, when a matter before a court involves an Indian tribe, the
courts generally agree that the judiciary should defer to the interpretation of
an applicable statute advanced in favor of the tribe. The Indian Canons of
Construction cemented this principle, and provide, in relevant part, that
“ambiguous provisions must be resolved in favor of the Indian parties
concerned . . . .”19 These two conflicting tools of statutory interpretation—
broad agency deference and the Indian Canons of Construction—raise
several potential issues, which this Note will analyze.
With regard to deferential treatment towards governmental agencies and
their interpretations of their originating statutes, one might argue that
deference should almost always be granted to the agency itself. After all,
Congress vests the power to interpret an organic statute in governmental
agencies because agencies are best equipped to handle the specified fields
they oversee. In a similar way, when cases involve a statute that affects
Indian tribes and their members, granting deference to the tribe’s
interpretation of that statute is equally imperative. Such deference tends to
promote Congress’s intention to draft legislation that enhances the health
and well-being of Indian tribes and their members.20 Thus, despite a well16. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984) (“We
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive
department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the
principle of deference to administrative interpretations.”); see also VALERIE C. BRANNON &
JARED P. COLE, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44954, CHEVRON DEFERENCE: A PRIMER 1–4 (2017),
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R44954.pdf.
17. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
18. Id.
19. DAVID H. GETCHES, CHARLES F. WILKINSON, ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., MATTHEW
L.M. FLETCHER & KRISTEN A. CARPENTER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
155–56 (7th ed. 2017).
20. BRANNON & COLE, supra note 16, at 3–4.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

182

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

intentioned rationale for granting deference to agencies, when these two
canons of construction collide, specifically in the healthcare sphere, the
judiciary necessarily should grant deference to the Indian tribes’
interpretation of that legislation.
This Note will analyze the Indian Canons of Construction as they relate
to health law. It will do so by examining the conflict between the doctrines
that grant broad deference to agencies and the canons that grants deference
to tribes. More specifically, this Note will explain how courts should decide
issues when these two doctrines clash, as well as which standard courts
should consider when analyzing the policy rationales that support a
particular judgment.
Part II will address the history of disparate treatment toward Native
American tribes by the federal government and how the federal
government’s historical dealings with the Natives affected their relationship
with the tribes. Part II will also explain the troubling health disparities
apparent among Native Americans today, as well as Congress’s attempts to
promote health and wellness amongst the tribes through the establishment
of agencies within the administrative state.
Part III will then briefly explain the case precedents set forth by the
courts with regard to administrative law and the levels of deference that
courts typically give to agencies in interpretive disputes.
Finally, Part IV will examine the ways in which the doctrines supporting
agency deference and tribal deference conflict with each other. The analysis
in Part IV will explain the policy rationale behind deferring to an agency’s
interpretation of its own statutes, as well as the importance of construing
statutes in favor of Native American tribes. When these principles are in
conflict, an important decision must be made as to which interpretation
should prevail. In this respect, Part IV aims to determine what courts will
do in the future and presents an argument that it is imperative to construe,
whenever possible, statutory language in favor of Native American.
II. Background
A. History of Native American Tribes and Culture
The relationship between the Indian tribes and federal government is
unique, resulting in complex legal issues that seem to constantly evolve. 21
In order to understand the legal intricacies embedded in federal Indian law,
one must first understand the history of Native American tribes, as well as
21. U.S COMM‘N ON C.R., supra note 5, at 21–24.
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the actions of the federal government that led to the current relationship.
Gloria Valencia-Weber, Professor of Indian Law at the University of New
Mexico, appropriately described federal Indian law as presenting “perhaps
the most direct challenge to the way that federal jurisprudence
accommodates or reflects multicultural interests within national
boundaries.”22
In the 1800s, led by the desire of the newly independent United States to
settle the New World (i.e., tribal land), a struggle for power commenced
between the tribes and federal government. 23 In 1830, Congress passed the
Indian Removal Act,24 which conveyed to President Andrew Jackson the
power to establish large tracts of land—later known as Indian
reservations—to relocate Indian tribes and their members.25 In exchange for
their land, Native Americans were promised perpetual ownership of all land
west of the Mississippi.26 This act of removal gave rise to the “Trail of
Tears,” wherein tens of thousands of Native Americans made the long trek
from their homelands to modern-day Oklahoma.27
Half a century later, in 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act
(GAA).28 The GAA ostensibly aimed to assimilate members of Indian tribes
into American society, but resulted in the cultural and communal
destruction of the tribes.29 It divided land that each tribe held collectively
into small parcels, which were then transferred to members of the tribe to
be held individually. 30 Importantly, the land that remained unallotted to
tribal members was left for European colonizers to settle. 31 Prior to the
GAA, tribal land amounted to about 138 million acres; by 1934, after all
tribal land was allotted, that number was reduced to a mere forty-eight
million acres.32
22. Gloria Valencia-Weber, American Indian Law and History: Instructional Mirrors,
44 J. LEGAL EDUC. 251, 251 (1994).
23. Ethan Davis, An Administrative Trail of Tears: Indian Removal, 50 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 49, 51–52 (2008-2010).
24. Ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411 (1830).
25. Davis, supra note 23, at 51–52.
26. Id.
27. Trail of Tears, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/
trail-of-tears (July 7, 2020).
28. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), discussed in Keith Harper, Cobell v. Norton:
Redressing a Century of Malfeasance, HUM. RTS., Spring 2006, at 5, 5.
29. Harper, supra note 28, at 5.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Under the GAA, the federal government held allotment land in trust. 33
And, pursuant to the trust relationship, “the United States appointed itself
trustee, with all the powers to sell and lease Indian assets—oil, gas, timber,
rights-of-way, etc.—without obtaining the landowners’ permission.” 34 Not
only did Native Americans oppose the allotment plan, but many tribes
vehemently rejected it, as most Indian tribes’ cultural values were rooted in
communal lifestyles.35 With many tribal members declining to accept
allotments, the federal government resorted to forcefully dividing tribal
land.36
The trust relationship also conferred a fiduciary duty onto the federal
government for the benefit of the tribes. This fiduciary duty required that
the United States provide generally for the tribes 37—a relationship that John
Marshall explained as resembling that of a guardian and a ward.38 In other
words, the United States took on the responsibility of supporting the Indian
tribes when the government undertook to create the trust relationship,39 and
this relationship continues to be uniquely important in the way the federal
government deals with the tribes. Unfortunately, however, in the decades
following the initial attempts to assimilate tribes via allotment, evidence
surfaced that the federal government abused its trust responsibilities
throughout the entirety of the allotment process.40
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Richard B. Collins, A Brief History of the U.S.-American Indian Nations
Relationship, HUM. RTS., Spring 2006, at 3, 4.
36. Id.
37. Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold Marshall Trilogy, 82 N.D. L. REV. 627, 659
(2006) (“[T]he federal government owes a duty—moral, ethical, or political—to Indians and
Indian tribes in all of its actions. This may be a guardian-ward relationship, a trusteebeneficiary relationship, or theoretically (according to Justice Johnson) a master-conqueror
relationship.”)
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Harper, supra note 28, at 5 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-216, at 4–5 (1989)). The
author offers several examples, including:
The trustee routinely enters into leases on behalf of Indians for 5 to 10 percent
of what non-Indians receive for the exact same type of transaction. In other
words, a Navajo Indian receives $9 to $25 per rod for a pipeline right-of-way
lease. A non-Indian receives no less than $140 and often $575 per rod for the
same lease.
Id. In another example, “[t]he trustee does not have an accounts receivable system . . . . So
the trustee is unaware when a beneficiary is owed a payment. If no payment is made, that is
usually the end of it.” Id.
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B. Health Disparities Among Native American Tribes
Health disparities that existed among Native Americans during the
earliest period of colonialism continue to persist today.41 In 2006, David
Jones, MD, wrote about the general health of Natives during the year
1955—the year Congress established the Indian Health Service42 (IHS):
Indian populations living in rural poverty suffered terribly from
disease. Tuberculosis continued to thrive, and infant mortality
reached 4 times the national average. During the past 50 years,
the IHS has improved health conditions dramatically, but
disparities persist—American Indians continue to experience
some of the worst health conditions in the United States.
Although this persistence is striking, it is even more striking that
the disparities have existed not for 50 years but for 500 years.
From the earliest years of colonization, American Indians have
suffered more severely whether the prevailing diseases were
smallpox, tuberculosis, alcoholism, or other chronic afflictions
of modern society.43
Notwithstanding the creation of programs like the IHS, disparities among
tribal members remain alarmingly high when compared to the general
populous of the United States. 44 The most recent data gathered by the IHS,
published in October 2019, reported that the average life expectancy of
Native Americans is five and a half years shorter than the average life
expectancy of all U.S. races combined. 45 In the same report, the IHS
published data on sixteen separate health-related causes of mortality,
including heart disease, diabetes, unintentional injuries, influenza or
pneumonia, and stroke. 46 In almost every area concerning health-related
causes of mortality, Native Americans suffer at a rate higher than the
average of all U.S. race populations. 47 For example, Native Americans,
when compared to the average of all U.S. races, develop heart disease at a
41. David S. Jones, The Persistence of American Indian Health Disparities, 96 AM. J.
PUB. HEALTH 2122, 2122 (2006); see also U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 5, at 2.
42. Jones, supra note 41, at 2122.
43. Id.
44. Disparities, supra note 9.
45. Id. (finding that the average life expectancy of all U.S. race populations in 2010 was
78.5 years, while that of the average American Indian in 2009-2011 was seventy-three
years).
46. Id.
47. Id.
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ratio of 1.1:1,48 influenza/pneumonia at a rate of 1.8:1, unintentional
injuries at a ratio of 2.5:1, and diabetes at a ratio of 3.2:1. 49 Moreover,
Indigenous Americans are far more likely to face poor health conditions as
a result of alcohol abuse; the IHS reports that American Indians and Alaska
Natives experience alcohol-induced diseases at a ratio of 6.6:1 and chronic
liver disease/cirrhosis at a ratio of 4.6:1. 50
On a broad scale, studies show that there are “persistent disparities in
infant mortality, life expectancy, and mortality from a variety of
conditions.”51 The American Public Health Association stated, “There is
also sufficient evidence of disparities in health care financing, access to
care, and quality of care to conclude that American Indians and Alaska
Natives are disadvantaged in the health care system.” 52 Perhaps most
concerning is the fact that this issue is not minor in that it does not impact
only a small number of Americans; rather, the health disparities that afflict
Natives constitute a widespread problem affecting the nearly 4.1 million
people who identify as Native American or Alaska Native. 53 The fact that
the Native American and Alaska Native populations comprise about 1.5%
of the United States population bolsters the urgency with which these issues
must be addressed.54
C. Health Law Administrative Structure
One avenue that Congress has used in its attempt to combat the alarming
health disparities among Indian tribes involves the administrative state. 55
Therefore, understanding the structure of the administrative state, which
provides health-related resources to Native Americans, is the foundation for
understanding the statutory interpretation questions.
Consistent with the administrative state’s purpose, Congress frequently
delegates its legislative power to administrative agencies in the interest of
efficiency, expertise, and bureaucratic neutrality.56 Within this
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Marsha Lillie-Blanton & Yvette Roubideaux, Understanding and Addressing the
Health Care Needs of American Indians and Alaska Natives, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 759,
759 (2005).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Boyum, supra note 12, at 241–42.
56. ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN & RICHARD E. LEVY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: AGENCY
ACTION IN LEGAL CONTEXT 8 (Saul Levmore et al. eds., 3d ed. 2020); Delegation of
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administrative structure, agencies, through their officers and members,
promulgate rules that regulate the implementation of statutory schemes. 57
Pursuant to agency regulations, programs are created and resources are
made available to those who qualify under certain enumerated
requirements. 58
For health law, the highest level of the administrative structure is the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), a cabinet-level
department within the executive branch of the United States government
that implements federal health programs. 59 The HHS aims to “enhance the
health and well-being of all Americans,”60 and it oversees various agencies,
such as the Indian Health Services (IHS) that serve to effectuate the mission
of the HHS.61
While the HHS oversees health programs for all American citizens, the
IHS provides health services specifically to American Indians and Alaska
Natives.62 The overarching purpose of the IHS is to enhance the health of
Native Americans to the highest level possible. 63 Among its responsibilities
are the administration of congressional statutory schemes promulgated to
advance Native health. 64 For example, in 1976 Congress passed the Indian
Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA) 65 to address the health needs of
American Indians and Alaska Natives “pursuant to the treaty and trust
obligations of the United States government.” 66 Accordingly, the IHCIA

Legislative Power, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/
constitution-conan/article-1/section-1/delegation-of-legislative-power (last visited Oct. 26,
2021).
57. GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 56, at 29.
58. Id.
59. About HHS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/
about/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2021).
60. Id.; see also U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HHS), GRANTS.GOV,
https://www.grants.gov/learn-grants/grant-making-agencies/department-of-health-andhuman-services.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2021).
61. HHS Agencies & Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., https://www.
hhs.gov/about/agencies/hhs-agencies-and-offices/index.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2021).
62. Agency Overview, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/overview/
(last visited Oct. 26, 2021).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Pub. L. No. 94-437, 90 Stat. 1400 (1976).
66. Brief History of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, NAT’L INDIAN HEALTH
BD.: TRIBAL HEALTH REFORM RES. CTR., https://www.nihb.org/tribalhealthreform/ihciahistory/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2021).
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appointed the IHS to effectuate Congress’s intent in establishing the
IHCIA. 67
When Congress enacted the IHCIA, adverse health outcomes were much
higher in Indian Country than those of the general population. 68 As such,
the health status of tribal members was of major concern to Congress. 69
Those concerns led to the promulgation of the IHCIA, in which Congress
described its policy rationale: “Federal health services to maintain and
improve the health of the Indians are consonant with and required by the
Federal Government’s historical and unique relationship with, and resulting
responsibility to, the American Indian people.” 70 The IHCIA is one of two
main sources of legislative authority for the IHS, 71 along with the Snyder
Act. 72
In 2010, after Congress endorsed the IHCIA four consecutive times, the
Affordable Care Act (ACA) permanently codified and expanded the
IHCIA. 73 The ACA actually amended the IHCIA by actualizing the payer
of last resort provision. 74 This provision essentially solidified the IHS as the
“payor of last resort for all services provided;” whereas, “[p]rior to the
ACA, IHS was the payor of last resort only for contract health services.”75
Playing a more supportive role under the umbrella of Indian health is the
Contract Health Service (CHS). Although Congress funds the CHS, the IHS
allocates funds to the CHS for health services and care that are not covered
directly by the IHS or a tribal healthcare facility. 76 In order to qualify for
CHS-funded services, an individual must “(1) Reside within the United
States and on a reservation located within a contract health service delivery
area; or (2) . . . not reside on a reservation but reside within a contract
67. Id.; Boyum, supra note 12, at 244.
68. Brief History of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, supra note 66.
69. Boyum, supra note 12, at 243–45.
70. 25 U.S.C. § 1601(1).
71. Id.; Legislation, INDIAN HEALTH SERV. https://www.ihs.gov/aboutihs/legislation/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 13; see also Legislation, supra note 71 (stating that the Snyder Act
“[p]rovides authority for the expenditure of such funds as Congress may appropriate for the
benefit, care and assistance to Indians throughout the United States”).
73. Brief History of the Indian Health Care Improvement Act, supra note 66; see also
Indian Health Care Improvement Act, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.gov/ihcia/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
74. See 42 C.F.R. § 136.61 (2021).
75. ELAYNE J. HEISLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41152, INDIAN HEALTH CARE : IMPACT
OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (ACA) 5 (2014).
76. Contract Health Services Fund Control, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.
gov/ihm/circulars/1991/contract-health-services-fund-control/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
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health service delivery area” (CHSDA) and be considered a member of the
tribe(s) located on that reservation or “maintain close economic and social
ties with that tribe or tribes.”77 Accordingly, the CHSDA “consist[s] of a
county which includes all or part of a reservation, and any county or
counties which have a common boundary with the reservation.” 78 CHS
funds can also be supplemented by the Catastrophic Health Emergency
Fund (CHEF), which Congress created to assist with excessive medical
costs due to catastrophes, to the extent that they are within the purview of
the IHS or Indian tribes.79 CHEF funds are used primarily for high-cost
illnesses, procedures, and diseases.80
Recently, many Indian tribes began to offer self-insurance programs,
more commonly known as “tribal self-insured plans.” These programs
permit a tribe to pay claims directly, allowing the tribe to provide medical
coverage for its tribal members at lower costs while also granting the tribe
the ability to exercise greater sovereignty. 81 While utilizing tribal selfinsured plans is popular amongst the tribes, alternative insurance options
are available to tribal members too: these include programs include, for
example, the Marketplace Health Insurance, Medicaid, and Children’s
Health Insurance Program (CHIP). 82
Relatedly, in 1975, Congress also enacted the Indian Self-Determination
and Education Assistance Act (ISEAA), which grants Indian tribes more
autonomy to govern their own programs. 83 Essentially, “[u]nder a selfdetermination contract, the federal government supplies funding to a tribal
organization, allowing [the tribe] to plan, conduct and administer a program
or service that the federal government otherwise would have provided
77. 42 C.F.R. § 136.23(a).
78. Requirements: Purchased/Referred Care [PRC] Delivery Areas, INDIAN HEALTH
SERV.,
https://www.ihs.gov/prc/eligibility/requirements-purchased-referred-care-prc-deli
very-areas/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2021).
79. Contract Health Services Fund Control, supra note 76.
80. Id.
81. Letter from Chief Lynn Malerba, Chairwoman of IHS Tribal Self-Governance
Advisory Comm., to Mary Smith, Principal Deputy Dir. of Indian Health Serv. 3 (May 10,
2016), https://www.tribalselfgov.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/2016.5.10_TSGAC-com
ments-on-CHEF-letter.pdf.
82. Health Care Coverage for American Indians & Alaska Natives, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/american-indians-alaska-natives/coverage/ (last visited Oct. 29,
2021).
83. See Geoffrey D. Strommer & Stephen D. Osborne, The History, Status, and Future
of Tribal Self-Governance Under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance
Act, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2014-2015) (citing Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203).
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directly.”84 ISEAA services include educational, social, and health-related
programs. 85
As applied to Native American tribes and their members, this
overarching structure of the health law administrative state becomes
increasingly important when considering the implications of health care
laws on Native Americans and, even more importantly, the basis upon
which those laws are adjudicated.
III. Historical Precedent and Jurisprudence
A. Deference to Administrative Agency Action
Chevron guides the courts on the principle of judicial deference within
the administrative state.86 In Chevron, the Supreme Court created a test to
determine when judicial deference should be given to an agency action if
the language of the empowering statute is ambiguous.87 This doctrine—
known as “Chevron deference”—is one of the most important and widely
used tests in modern administrative law. 88 Under Chevron, the reviewing
court will defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if the agency’s
action is reasonable. 89 Furthermore, where Chevron deference is given,
“[t]he scope of the Chevron deference doctrine is that when a legislative
delegation to an administrative agency on a particular issue or question is
not explicit but rather implicit, a court may not substitute its own
interpretation of the statute for a reasonable interpretation made by the
administrative agency.”90 Stated another way, the reasonableness standard
applies regardless of whether the court finds another reasonable—or even
more favorable—interpretation of a statute than that of the agency.
Ultimately, when applying Chevron to a dispute, “a very low threshold”
is required to allow the court to defer to an agency’s construction of a
statute.91 Thus, an agency’s interpretation of a statute is generally
84. Rancheria v. Hargan, 296 F. Supp. 3d 256, 260 (2017) (quoting FGS Constructors,
Inc. v. Carlow, 64 F.3d 1230, 1234 (8th Cir. 1995)).
85. Strommer & Osborne, supra note 83, at 4.
86. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
87. Chevron Deference, CORNELL L. SCH.: LEGAL INFO. INST. (Dec. 2017), https://www.
law.cornell.edu/wex/chevron_deference.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. David Kemp, Chevron Deference: Your Guide to Understanding Two of Today’s
SCOTUS Decisions, JUSTIA L. BLOG (May 21, 2012), https://lawblog.justia.com/2012/
05/21/chevron-deference-your-guide-to-understanding-two-of-todays-scotus-decisions.
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considered reasonable so long as it is unambiguous as pertaining to the
specific issue being addressed. 92 On the other hand, where the intent of the
statute is clear, a court need not resort to Chevron but can instead simply
apply the statute’s plain meaning.93
Notably, the Supreme Court took measures to narrow Chevron deference
in the decades following the decision. In more recent cases, the Court
outlined exceptions and alternative tests to apply under limited
circumstances. And due to this narrowing of the Chevron doctrine, at least
one additional test surfaced to control the analysis where certain conditions
are met: Skidmore deference. 94 The Court applied Skidmore deference in the
case of Christensen v. Harris County.95 Using the factors in Skidmore v.
Swift,96 the Christensen Court held that, when considering whether to defer
to an agency’s construction of the agency’s organic statute, the Court will
consider these factors97: “thoroughness evident in its consideration, the
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if
lacking power to control.”98 The following year, the Court upheld Skidmore
deference in United States v. Mead Corp.99
The judiciary continues to rely largely upon the doctrines of deference in
order to give broad effect to agency interpretations of statutes. The
application of Chevron100 and Skidmore101 is the driving force behind this
broad deference.
B. Canon of Construction Favoring Indian Tribes
While the precedent set by Chevron and its progeny generally apply to
most adjudicatory actions involving administrative agencies, the Court
carved out contrary doctrines of interpretation for the statutes that regulate
resources and programs involving Native American tribes. For example, in
Maniilaq Ass’n v. Burwell, the Court discussed the ISDEAA and
Congress’s intentions surrounding the promulgation of the law, specifically
92. Id.; Chevron Deference, supra note 87.
93. Chevron Deference, supra note 87.
94. Skidmore Deference, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Skidmore_deference
(last visited Oct. 29, 2021); see Chevron Deference, supra note 87.
95. 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
96. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
97. Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
98. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140, cited in Christensen, 529 U.S. at 587.
99. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
100. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
101. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
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stating, “In enacting the ISDEAA, Congress explicitly codified the rule of
construction in favor of Indian tribes.”102 The canon of construction to
which the Court made reference describes the broad standard of deference
given to Native tribes, which is parallel to the deference given to agency
action under Chevron.103 This creates a potential conflict between the
deference afforded under the Chevron doctrine and the canon of
construction in favor of Indian tribes.
The United States District Court for the District of Columbia
acknowledged this conflict in Rancheria v. Hargan,104 where it explained
that courts are generally “guided by ‘the principles of Chevron’” when
considering “an agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute and the laws
it administers.”105 However, “[i]n cases involving American Indians . . .
courts have applied the canon of construction that ‘statutes are to be
construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions
interpreted to their benefit.’” 106 The Court then explained the conflict
presented by the competing standards, stating that “the canon of
construction in favor of Indian tribes can trump the deference to agencies'
interpretations courts ordinarily give under Chevron and its progeny.”107
Later, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit further
clarified the canon of construction favoring Indian tribes. In Muscogee
(Creek) Nation v. Hodel, the court decided between two competing
interpretations of a statute where both an agency and a Native tribe were
parties to the litigation.108 The court held:
If there is any ambiguity as to the inconsistency and/or the repeal
of the Curtis Act, the OIWA must be construed in favor of the
Indians, i.e., as repealing the Curtis Act and permitting the
establishment of Tribal Courts. The result, then, is that if the
OIWA can reasonably be construed as the Tribe would have it
construed, it must be construed that way.109

102. 72 F. Supp. 3d 227, 232–33 (D.D.C. 2014).
103. Id.
104. 296 F. Supp. 3d 256 (D.D.C. 2017).
105. Id. at 266 (quoting Mount Royal Joint Venture v. Kempthorne, 477 F.3d 745, 754
(D.C. Cir. 2007)).
106. Id. (quoting Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1985)).
107. Id. at 267 (citing Maniilaq Ass’n, 72 F. Supp. 3d at 232).
108. 851 F.2d 1439 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
109. Id. at 1445.
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The Supreme Court previously described the policy rationale for this
tribal standard of deference in Blatchford v. Alaska Native Tribal Health
Consortium.110 There, the Court held that, “[i]n enacting the Indian Health
Care Improvement Act, Congress found that ‘[f]ederal health services to
maintain and improve the health of the Indians are consonant with and
required by the Federal Government's historical and unique legal
relationship with, and resulting responsibility to, the American Indian
people.’”111 Furthermore, the Court explained, “Congress declares that it is
the policy of this Nation, in fulfillment of its special trust responsibilities
and legal obligations to Indians . . . to ensure the highest possible health
status for Indians and urban Indians and to provide all resources necessary
to affect that policy.”112
IV. Analysis
A. Competing Standards of Deference and Statutory Interpretation
The arguments surrounding the level of deference that courts grant to
agencies within the scope of administrative law are complex and
necessarily implicate various other areas of law and policy. For example,
Chevron deference recently gave rise to arguments of potential violations of
the non-delegation doctrine. 113 As a result, it is very possible that the Court
will revisit Chevron in the future to question the validity of the broad level
of deference granted to agency action and interpretation. 114
What remains clear is that there are, and presumably will continue to be,
many instances in which the deferential administrative law standards of
Chevron and Skidmore conflict with the Indian Canons of Construction.
Until the Supreme Court has the opportunity to make a final determination
on the matter, the lower courts will likely disagree as to which doctrine of
statutory interpretation controls in instances where the two doctrines clash.
The central question becomes: which legal construct is appropriate when
they clash? Which one wins when the two square up? Not surprisingly,
lower courts differ on this issue. 115

110. 645 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2011).
111. Id. at 1090 (alteration in original) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1601(1)).
112. Id.
113. GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 56, at 8.
114. Id.
115. Id. (“When an agency's interpretation of a statute conflicts with that of an American
Indian tribe, Circuits are split on which canon controls.”).
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B. Arguments in Favor of Agency Interpretation of Statutes
Inevitably, cases will arise where courts must to choose to defer to either
an interpretation construed by an administrative agency or one construed by
a Native American tribe.
Admittedly, there are policy interests that support the use of
administrative agencies to aid in executing the laws of the government.
First, administrative agencies provide a more efficient avenue for
lawmaking and executive action. 116 The delegation of power to agencies
allows Congress to redirect its focus to more pressing issues; this
complements an increased ability on the part of Congress to work more
effectively and efficiently, as opposed to overseeing all federal regulations
and policies on its own.117 Similarly, administrative agencies are generally
led by personnel or board members who are experts in a particular field—
typically the area being regulated by the statutes at issue in the relevant
court proceedings. 118 Presumably, this means that agencies are better
equipped with the knowledge, data, and resources necessary to effectuate
legitimate and appropriate regulations. 119
For those reasons, interpreting a statute in favor of Indian tribes could,
hypothetically, undermine the policy interests served by Congressional
delegations to administrative agencies. It is possible that interpreting
statutory language in favor of the tribes, and in direct conflict with agency
interpretations, could effectively remove a degree of congressionally
delegated power from administrative agencies—the same agencies who are
tasked with creating and executing the laws on behalf of, and in the best
interest of, the Indian Nations. More specifically, construing statues in a
way that is contradictory to the IHS’s understanding thereof could hinder
the IHS and its regulatory scheme, thereby defeating the whole purpose of
the IHS’s existence.
Accordingly, some would argue, that while the legislature promulgates
and executes the laws, the courts or the tribes could have a high degree of
influence in determining statutory meaning, even if the tribal interpretation
is in direct conflict with that of the administrative agency to whom
Congress delegated its power. Some would argue that the potential for the
courts to determine the meaning of a congressional statute raises
constitutional concerns regarding the inherent separation of powers
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.; Delegation of Legislative Power, supra note 56.
GLICKSMAN & LEVY, supra note 56, at 8.
Id.
Id.
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doctrine. Alternatively, some may express concerns that, by promoting a
reading of statute in favor of those who benefit from it, agency action could
be undermined—and the true intent of the statute may be misconstrued—
effectively rendering the statute pointless. While these are valid concerns,
they are also easily resolved when considering the responsibilities of
Congress in its dealings with tribes and the very purpose of the statutes
being interpreted.
C. The Necessity for Statutory Interpretation in Favor of Native Americans
On the other hand, in the area of health law especially, it is imperative
that the courts yield to the tribes and interpret statutes in their favor. Such
determinations are rooted in the unique relationship between the federal
government and Native tribes. These canons serve Congress’ overarching
policy of promoting tribal self-determination. Stated differently, the canons
further the central purpose of the administrative structure dealing with
Native health, by helping tribal members to reach better health outcomes.
Notably, the main reason Congress delegates power to agencies to
oversee Indian governmental services is to promote better health and
welfare within Native American communities. 120 Subsequently, the
agencies’ intentions in promulgating regulations are for the primary
purpose of providing services, resources, and health care to the tribal
members.121
For these reason, the IHS created health services and drafted statutes in a
way that would not only preserve tribal resources but enhance the overall
health among the Indian Nations.122 This intention is reinforced by the trust
relationship owed by the federal government to the Native peoples, and
hinges on the duty of the government to provide for the tribes. 123 It
therefore follows that, where a tribe’s interpretation of a health-related
statute conflicts with that of a governmental agency’s, the tribe should be
given deference to interpret the statute, because these health laws govern
tribal medical programs and should thus be construed in a way that works
for the benefit of the tribe. If the federal government wants to know what is
best for the tribes and their overall health, it should pay attention to the
ways in which the tribes decipher federal legislation pertaining to their
specific situations. Or, better yet, ask them.

120.
121.
122.
123.

See Collins, supra note 35, at 24; see also Boyum, supra note 12, at 241.
Collins, supra note 35, at 24.
Id.
Id.
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Furthermore, this deferential and patient-centered policy allows federal
health services to begin to bridge the gap in health disparities for tribal
members. Disparities in individual health and wellness among tribal
members, specifically compared to the average American, can arguably be
traced back to the lack of funding for health programs.124 Notwithstanding a
reformation of the laws that govern federally funded Indian health services
and related programs, health statutes affecting Native Americans should be
drafted and construed in favor of Natives in order to serve the very
intentions of Congress in creating the agencies that oversee Indian services,
as well as the agency’s purpose in creating statutes and regulations in
support of Indian tribes and their members. There is still an immense need
for improvement in terms of resources, services, and funding; but
construing statutes that affect Native Americans in a way that benefit
Native Americans is just one step in promoting better health care access and
quality among Indian tribes.
Recently, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit actually construed a
health statute in favor of the Indian tribe in Rancheria v. Hargan.125 There,
the Redding Rancheria Tribe filed a civil action against the acting secretary
of the United States Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). 126
The Tribe attempted to create a tribal self-insurance plan that functioned in
concordance with the resources provided by the IHS in order to maximize
the benefits and resources available to its members. 127
The statutory provision at issue was § 1623(b) of the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act, which outlined a payor of last resort provision, the terms
of which were subject to differing interpretations by both the Redding
Rancheria Tribe and the IHS.128 As a preliminary matter, § 1623 of the
applicable statute intended to “prevent . . . recovery . . . absent specific
written authorization from the tribe.” 129 Significantly, the tribal selfinsurance plan at issue in the case included an exclusionary clause, whereby
the Redding Rancheria Tribe asserted that the payer of last resort provision
would not apply to the tribal self-insurance plan. 130 To the contrary, the IHS
argued that the payor of last resort provision should be interpreted “to

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Boyum, supra note 12, at 244.
296 F. Supp. 3d 256 (2017).
Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 267 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 1623(b)).
Id. at 271.
Id. at 270–71.
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exclude tribal self-insurance programs.”131 Further, the significance of the
interpretation of this provision is amplified by the fact that the CHS is the
primary source of funding for services offered and covered by IHS, but the
CHS is also a payor-of-last resort.132
In Rancheria, the court declined to defer to the agency’s interpretation of
the statutory language under Chevron, ultimately finding that the language
was unambiguous.133 Further, the court noted:
[I]n cases where it is unclear whether the payor of last resort is
the Tribe's self-funded insurance or CHS, funded by IHS, the
IHCIA provides that the Tribe can decide which program is
primary:
Absent specific written authorization by the governing body
of an Indian tribe . . . the United States shall not have a right
of recovery under this section if the injury, illness, or
disability for which health services were provided is covered
under a self-insurance plan funded by an Indian tribe, tribal
organization, or urban Indian organization. Where such
authorization is provided, the Service may receive and expend
such amounts for the provision of additional health services
consistent with such authorization.134
In holding for the Redding Rancheria Tribe, the court explained that the
agency’s interpretation contradicted Congress’s intent and that the Tribe
had the ability to determine the primary payor in the present situation. 135
The Rancheria court did not answer the question concerning which doctrine
of statutory interpretation would prevail—Chevron or the Indian Canons of
Construction—if both were in conflict. Instead, Chevron plainly did not
apply to the organic statute drafted by Congress, because it was found to be
clear and unambiguous by its language and intent. 136 However, the court did
note that the circuit courts are split on this exact issue.137 Unless and until
the Supreme Court addresses the conflict between these doctrines of
statutory interpretation, lower courts will continue to apply the doctrines

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 271.
Id. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 271 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 1621e(f)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 266.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

198

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

inconsistently where a case involves conflicting interpretations of a statute
by an administrative agency and an Indian tribe.
So, when this issue arises, which canon of construction should the
Supreme Court apply? Based on the trust relationship that exists between
the Indian tribes and the United States, the federal government owes a
heightened level of responsibility to the tribes. 138 The federal government
implicitly agreed to provide for the tribes through the formation of the trust
relationship—and one of the services the government agreed to provide the
members of Indian tribes is health care programs and services. 139
Presumably, the federal government’s intent was to establish a system
that would allow Native Americans to receive adequate healthcare. At a
minimum, the federal government surely intended for Native Americans to
have access to services that will allow them to reach health care outcomes
equal to those of other American citizens. Yet, as previously discussed, the
health care outcomes of Native Americans are consistently lower than those
of other racial and political groups.140 The natural response, therefore, is to
question the system implemented by the United States. Similarly, the
execution of the services put in place must be analyzed and the judiciary
must consider its role.
Although the reason for these disparities is, seemingly, not studied
thoroughly enough to determine one exact cause, it is clear that there are
improvements to be made in the way that the federal government
approaches providing healthcare to tribal members. One plausible
alternative to the current system would involve asking tribes about their
healthcare needs. By raising the level of communication between the
federal government and the tribes, better statutes, services, and programs
could be implemented to serve Congress’s goal of promoting good health
among the tribes. After all, those best positioned to determine what they
need are the tribal members themselves.
This proposed solution is not unimaginable or unattainable. The Bureau
of Indian Affairs (BIA) is comprised of varying offices, including the
Division of Human Services (DHS).141 By creating a subcommittee within
the DHS, the government could appoint personnel for the specific purpose
138. See Collins, supra note 35, at 4 (citing S. REP. NO. 101-216, at 4–5 (1989)); see also
Fletcher, supra note 37.
139. Collins, supra note 35, at 24 .
140. Jones, supra note 41; see also U.S. COMM’N ON C.R., supra note 5, at 2–4;
Disparities, supra note 9.
141. Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: INDIAN AFFAIRS,
https://www.bia.gov/bia (last visited Jan. 30, 2022)
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of developing and enhancing tribal services. Communicating directly with
the tribes and their members regarding health-related matters would
improve transparency and generate more potential solutions to health issues
faced by the tribes.
Similarly, another way the government could attempt to improve health
outcomes among tribes is by deferring to tribes’ interpretations of statutes
pertaining to their healthcare in adjudication. If Congress’s purpose in
promulgating statutes is to promote good health among the Indian tribes,
then it is important for the courts to defer to Indian tribes’ interpretations of
those statutes. After all, tribes understand better than anyone else how they
will benefit from governmental services provided by statute.
Some might argue that following the interpretations that favor Native
Americans over the interpretations of government agencies would yield too
much power to the tribes. However, it’s important to keep in mind that the
Indian Canons of Construction only apply where a congressional statute is
ambiguous. Thus, if Congress is concerned that an interpretation of a statute
provides too much authority to Native American tribes, Congress can
amend the statute. In doing so, Congress has the opportunity to provide
clarity and override interpretive disputes.
Ultimately, in light of the trust relationship between the federal
government and the Indian tribes, Congress’s intent in creating an
administrative structure to support healthcare within the tribes’, and the
tribes’ superior understanding of their own health needs, the Indian Canons
of Construction requiring courts to defer to the statutory interpretation in
favor of a tribe play an important role in the judicial system. Based on the
federal government’s trust duty, the courts have an obligation to interpret
healthcare statutes to provide the greatest benefit to the tribes, even if the
interpretation that favors the tribes is in direct contradiction to that of an
administrative agency. This is one area where the broad deference
traditionally afforded to agencies should not prevail.
V. Conclusion
The history of the relationship between Native American tribes and the
federal government is long and complex. The creation of the trust
relationship established a unique association between the federal
government and Indian tribes that accorded great responsibility to the
government. And although the intentions of the federal government to
provide healthcare services through administrative agencies and statutes to
the tribes seem favorable, it has effectively failed to protect tribes. There is

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

200

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

no doubt that additional measures must be taken to assist Native Americans
to achieve the same health outcomes as other citizens.
One way for the federal government to further promote better health
among Indian tribes is to invoke the canon of construction that requires
them to construe statutes in favor of Indian tribes, specifically in health law
cases. Congress intentionally delegated responsibility for Indian law and
health law to administrative agencies. Furthermore, Congress seemingly
expanded these portions of the administrative state to address the point at
which the two interests collide. Noting the disparities in health outcomes
among Indian tribes, Congress’s intention in creating the IHS and related
agencies was to ensure that the health of Indian tribal members was not
only considered, but encouraged, supported, and promoted.
For this reason, and all the reasons explained above, when the judiciary
is tasked with interpreting a health law statute, deference should be given to
the Indian tribes whenever possible. And where the canon of construction
favoring the Indian tribes is at odds with the deference typically afforded to
administrative agencies, the canon favoring Indian tribes should control.
Such a practice would protect, at least in the area of health law, Congress’s
attempt to implement a statutory scheme promoting health among the
Indian tribes. Deferring to tribes will safeguard the promises made, and
duties assumed, by the federal government according to the trust-trustee
relationship it holds with the tribes.
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